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Tracking	Covid-19	using	big	data	and	big	tech:	a
digital	Pandora’s	Box
Stephen	L	Roberts	explains	why,	despite	the	supplemental	value	of	some	digital	surveillance
practices	in	the	tracking	of	disease	outbreaks,	the	concerns	which	arise	from	their	use	are	multi-
faceted	and	complex.
The	Covid-19	pandemic	has	brought	new	big	data-driven	practices	of	infectious	disease
surveillance	to	the	forefront	of	efforts	to	track	cases	in	real-time.	As	infections	have	continued	to
spread	across	the	globe,	governments	have	increasingly	sought	to	capitalise	on	the	volume,	variety	and	velocity	of
the	Big	Data	era,	and	to	partner	with	Big	Tech	corporations	in	order	to	accelerate	the	surveillance	of	infected
populations.
China	has	led	the	global	charge	in	harnessing	the	digital	turn	of	infectious	disease	surveillance	practices	in	order	to
monitor	the	movement	of	its	citizens,	to	track	suspected	infections	in	real-time,	and	in	the	unprecedented
quarantining	of	tens	of	millions	of	citizens	at	critical	phases	of	the	pandemic.	China’s	employment	of	big	data-driven
tactics	of	population	surveillance	is	without	parallel	in	this	pandemic:	ranging	from	the	accessing	and	monitoring	of
citizens’	use	of	social	media	and	communication	apps,	to	the	use	of	drone	technology	to	enforce	population
quarantine,	to	the	application	of	facial	recognition	technology	to	identify	suspected	infected	individuals.	Most
recently,	Hanwang	Technology	Co.	(Hanvon),	China’s	leading	firm	specialising	in	recognition	technology,	whose
client-base	includes	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Public	Security,	announced	that	it	had	developed	the	first	facial
recognition	technology	which	made	it	possible	to	successfully	identify	persons	even	when	they	are	wearing
facemasks.
Elsewhere,	states	have	also	opted-in	to	the	intensifying	union	of	‘Big	Data	and	Big	Tech’	with	public	health	security
measures.	Taiwan,	for	example	has	sought	to	control	its	national	rate	of	infections	through	implementing	an	‘electric
fence‘	programme	which	uses	mobile	phone	location-tracking	to	ensure	quarantined	persons	remain	in	their	home.
Similar	measures	aimed	at	limiting	population	movements	by	digital	mediums	have	also	been	implemented	in
Singapore.	The	Russian	government	has	also	intensified	its	digital	surveillance	activities	by	operationalising
thousands	of	security	cameras	in	urban	centres	enabled	with	facial	recognition	technology.	In	recent	weeks,	Israel
announced	it	would	be	commencing	the	tracking	of	mobile	phones	to	identify	cases	of	Covid-19	in	the	country,
using	technology	and	software	originally	developed	for	counter-terrorism	purposes.
Expanding	tech-focused	responses	to	this	global	pandemic	have	also	emerged	in	the	UK.	In	late	March,	it	was
revealed	that	the	NHS	would	be	partnering	with	a	number	of	Big	Tech	corporations,	most	notably	Google,	Amazon,
and	data-processing	firm	Palantir	to	develop	a	shared	data	platform	to	assist	in	Covid-19	surveillance.
Understandably,	this	announcement	has	sparked	widespread	unease	across	the	UK	regarding	the	roles	and
motivations	of	these	Big	Tech	actors,	and	their	increased	stakes	in	informing	and	assisting	responses	to	global
public	health	emergencies.
In	recent	UK	memory,	Google	is	perhaps	most	infamously	known	for	the	breach	of	data	laws	and	privacy	which
occurred	in	the	contexts	of	a	partnership	between	Google	DeepMind	and	the	Royal	Free	London	Trust,	which
involved	the	transfer	of	identifiable	patient	records	across	the	entire	Trust,	without	explicit	consent,	for	the	purpose
of	developing	a	clinical	alert	app	for	acute	kidney	injury.	Of	equal	concern,	until	its	partnership	with	the	NHS,
Palantir	was	perhaps	most	widely	known	as	a	data-processing	firm	which	has	continued	to	supply	American
immigration	authorities	with	technology	and	analytics	used	for	the	separation	of	families	and	deportation	of
migrants.	In	seeking	to	alleviate	public	concerns	centring	on	data	privacy,	as	well	as	the	role	of	these	for-profit
corporations	in	the	UK’s	ongoing	response	to	Covid-19,	the	NHS	and	UK	government	have	continued	to	emphasise
that	tech	corporations	involved	in	the	response	to	Covid-19	do	not	control	the	data,	nor	are	these	corporations
permitted	to	use	confidential	patient	data	for	research	or	commercial	purposes.
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On	one	hand,	recent	research	investigating	these	transformations	has	illustrated	the	supplemental	potential	of
digital	disease	tracking	in	highlighting	how	new	data	sources	and	technological	advancements	can	aid	in	identifying
and	responding	to	outbreaks.	On	the	other	hand,	these	unparalleled	shifts	in	surveillance	operations	also
underscore	the	intensifying	fusion	of	Big	Tech	corporations	and	state	surveillance	activities	within	global	health
security	frameworks.
The	political	challenges	and	implications	posed	by	these	global	transformations	are,	like	the	pandemic,
unprecedented.	Moreover,	the	rapid	rise	of	these	data-driven	surveillance	operations,	enabled	largely	by	tech
corporations	and	proliferating	in	the	forms	of	public-private	partnerships,	tracking	apps,	GPS	devices,	drones,	and
facial	recognition	technologies	has	unfolded	amid	an	intensified	debate	of	trade-offs	between	collective	security	and
individual	autonomy	in	all	regions	affected	by	the	pandemic.	Amid	a	shared	sense	of	global	emergency,	innovation
appears	to	have	outpaced	regulation	in	accounting	for	these	expanding	surveillance	capacities.
Growing	unease	with	the	increasing	stake	held	by	Big	Tech	in	assisting	governments	to	regulate	public
emergencies,	and	concerns	surrounding	corporate	and	political	interests	converge	in	the	contexts	of	this	current
global	pandemic.	Highly	sensitive	and	confidential	patient	data	held	by	organisations	including	the	NHS	is	valued	in
the	billions,	yet	the	transfer	of	millions	of	records	by	the	Royal	Free	to	Google’s	DeepMind	in	2015	occurred	without
public	debate	or	consultation	with	relevant	public	bodies.	Five	years	after	this	infamous	data	and	privacy	breach,
Google	has	once	again	partnered	with	the	NHS	to	assist	with	the	development	of	a	datastore	as	part	of	the	NHS’s
larger	project	with	tech	corporations	to	track	and	respond	to	Covid-19.	Yet,	once	more,	concerned	sources	have
drawn	attention	to	the	speed	at	which	patient	data	is	now	being	accumulated	and	processed	by	these	mediums	to
track	Covid-19,	with	apparent	insufficient	regard	for	privacy,	ethics	or	data	protection.
Beyond	this,	public	scrutiny	must	also	be	directed	to	consider	the	potential	‘after-life’	of	these	technologies	and	new
logics	of	big	data-driven	surveillance	which	could	linger	on,	or	be	re-purposed	after	the	pandemic	has	subsided.	In
some	countries,	enhanced	digital	surveillance	capacities	have	been	developed	and	launched	in	tandem	with	the
arrival	and	escalation	of	cases	of	infections,	while	in	other	states,	particularly	with	authoritarian	governance
structures,	these	accelerated	health	surveillance	practices	appear	now	as	dual-use	technologies,	which	have	been
hastily	drafted	into	outbreak	responses.	Subsequently,	these	technologies	cannot	only	trace	and	identify	the
movement	of	viruses,	but	also	the	movement	of	any	surveyed	population,	whether	during	health	emergencies	or
otherwise.
In	states	with	stronger	governance	culture	and	institutional	legitimacy,	including	the	UK,	the	task	at	hand	then	for
researchers,	academic	networks,	civil	society	and	communities	will	be	to	continually	hold	governments	to	full
account	on	the	partnerships	they	forge	with	for-profit	tech	corporations	and	security	firms	during	states	of
emergency.	Within	these	citizen-led	evaluations,	critical	further	explanations	must	include	how	and	what	sources	of
data	are	being	collected	and	used,	and	for	what	purposes,	and	how	will	such	surveillance	operations	be	securely
suspended,	dissembled,	and	de-escalated	following	the	cessation	of	epidemics	and	pandemics.	In	some	cases,	the
basic	question	of	whether	such	partnerships	and	expanded	surveillance	capacities	should	be	even	considered	must
also	be	asserted.
Lastly,	it	is	critical	to	recall	how	public	health	emergencies	are	often	rooted	and	proliferate	from	endemic	economic,
environmental,	historic,	social	and	political	realities,	far	divorced	from	the	tech	corporations,	data-warehouses	and
algorithms	which	now	guide	and	inform	the	responses	to	emergent	epidemics	and	pandemics.	As	findings	from
previous	public	health	emergencies	demonstrate,	accelerated	disease	surveillance	practices	and	the	accrual	of
ever	more	personal	data	during	outbreaks	can	and	will	fail	to	deliver	on	promises	of	health	security	and	outbreak
control	if	these	new	surveillance	operations	are	not	paired	with	continued	investments	with	on-the-ground
infrastructures,	including	robust	healthcare	systems,	secure	supplies	of	medical	resources,	and	public	trust	in
institutions,	all	of	which	are	critical	in	addressing	any	public	health	risk.
It	has	been	claimed	that	the	Covid-19	pandemic	represents	a	watershed	moment	for	global	health	systems;	a	point
of	no	return,	and	a	needed	opportunity	to	re-consider	future	directions	of	governance	and	security	practices.	As
more	and	more	state	governments	roll	out	increasingly	opaque	and	digitised	operations	in	the	era	of	Big	Data,
digital	disease	surveillance	practices	and	the	‘creep’	of	tech	corporations	must	continue	to	be	included	and	actively
scrutinised	in	assessments,	evaluations	and	critiques	of	responses	to	pandemics,	during	and	after	Covid-19.
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In	charting	a	path	forward	for	global	health	researchers	and	communities,	it	must	be	underscored	that	regulation	of
these	practices,	technologies	and	actors	cannot	be	merely	understood	as	an	endpoint	or	a	final	destination	at	which
we	will	at	some	point	arrive	at	and	conclude.	Rather,	regulation	must	take	the	form	of	a	continued	and	evolving
state	of	vigilance,	scrutiny,	education,	cooperation,	and	oversight.	Orientated	towards	the	long	term,	the	addressing
of	these	highlighted	political	challenges,	like	the	pandemic	itself,	will	be	a	marathon,	not	a	sprint.
___________________
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